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Abstract
In 1951, Executive Behaviour, the first systematic account about what managers are doing
was published. The book is still regarded as an important source of knowledge and this article
aims to explain why this is the case by shed light on some of the unique qualities of the book.
Executive Behaviour still gives a general and complete picture about managerial work since it
covers a wide spectrum of topics. Many of the conclusions have been replicated in later
studies but there is also insights in the book that has been largely neglected by later research -
the importance of time (the use of it) and space (the interplay between the CEO and his social
and physical environment). Executive Behaviour can thus still be used as an inspirational
source in future research.
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Introduction
"Executive Behaviour" is a remarkable book. It gives an account of the first
systematic study of the work of top managers ever made and it is one of the earliest empirical
studies in business administration in all categories. The focus of the extensive investigation
4was the elite of Swedish business life. Still, after 50 years it represents an important source of
knowledge about the nature of managerial work. For instance, Rosemary Stewart, a leading
researcher recommends it to all future students in this field of knowledge:
"Despite all subsequent research, Carlson's book remains a study that any
researcher interested in recording work activities, by whatever methods, should read
carefully." (Stewart, 1996: 3102)
The aim of the article is to explain why Executive Behavior gives a valid
account about managerial work, and why it should be given a larger position than just being a
pioneering work. The article is based on a deep reading of Executive Behaviour, an
examination of important impetus in form of major references, literature about the Swedish
economy of that time and on two interviews with Sune Carlson (December 8, 1998 and
December 15, 1998).
The article starts with a resume of the content in Executive behavior, followed
by a description of the context and participants of the study. The then following section
provides an overview of how the study was conducted and central methodological and
theoretical pre-assumptions are presented. The final section of the article gives an account of
how Executive Behaviour has influenced subsequent research on managerial work.
Dedication
The article is dedicated to Professor Sune Carlson who died in September 1999.
5Executive Behaviour, a resume
Executive Behaviour starts with a brief description of the origin of study, how a committee of
CEOs was formed and the reasons for starting an investigation of the content and
characteristics of the work of the participants (p. 13-17). Then Carlson line out the
methodological consideration the guided the start of the research (p. 17-25). He argued for the
need of truly operational concepts and he was criticizing the present state-of-affairs within the
administrative theory; the concepts used were ambiguous and difficult to relate to actual
behavior of managers. The first chapter is concluded by a presentation of previous studies of
administrative behavior (p. 25-30). Particularly the study by Harold Lasswell (Lasswell,
1947) was influential.
In chapter two it is described how Carlson developed a method for studying the
CEOs. Five dimensions were used: 1) Place of work, 2) Contacts with persons and
institutions, 3) Technique of communication, 4) Nature of question handled, and 5) Kind of
action (p. 34-39). The following section presents comments and reflections about this
classification and the work of gathering the data (p. 39-50). Several techniques and many
informants were used in order to collect a representative material of how the CEOs were
behaving. The study was ambitious executed.
Chapter three is devoted to the social environment of the CEOs. Carlson points
out that the Swedish community is rather small and that the homogeneity between the CEOs
as a group is relatively high (p. 56). An important feature of the Swedish economy was the
high degree of centralization, where the freedom of activity was curtailed by an increasing
number of government regulations and restrictions imposed by trade associations, trade
unions and employers' federation (p. 60). As a consequence of the corporativistic
environment, the CEOs had to devote a considerable amount of time on public relations.
6Where the CEOs were working and how much is the topic in chapter four. The
CEOs spend at an average 32% of the work on activities outside the firm, a figure that
Carlson regarded as maybe too high (p. 64-68). The absentee periods created in some
companies disturbances in the administrative processes due to insufficient decentralization of
authority and responsibilities. On the other hand, the CEOs didn't carried out inspection tours
as often as they would like to since the tours often wasn't scheduled (p. 68-71), The CEOs had
got a kind of "diary complex", what was not put in the calendar would not be carried out.
Carlson also regarded the time for reading and contemplation insufficient, due to the lack of
undisturbed time. The work alone at own office was fragmented, "[hardly time enough for]
light a cigarette before they were interrupted..." (p. 73-74). The chapter is concluded by an
analysis of the total working load. Carlson found that the CEO had too much working
pressure, which led to long working days and to sacrifices of their private life. Also the heavy
workload made the CEOs rather "narrow" in broader social and cultural affairs.
The chapter five is primarily about whom the CEOs are meeting and the
techniques of communication. Carlson was surprised that the CEOs seldom used letters as a
means of communications (p. 83), and that they rarely meet customers and suppliers (p. 84).
The main part of this chapter is about condition that Carlson perceives as problems in the
communication; the inefficient organizing of committee work (p. 85-87); the too heavy paper
ballast on the CEOs desk (p. 88-90) and deficiencies in handling visitors and telephone calls
(p. 90-93). With the full use of secretaries, assistants, telephone operators and physical
arrangements, the CEO will have more time to think and plan for the future.
The analysis of communication is deepened in chapter six, and more
administrative problems are discussed. Carlson suggested that the mapping of contact pattern
could be used as a tool for diagnosing administrative efficiency, especially for the detection of
shortcuts and short-circuits in the communication lines (p. 96). Another problems of
7communication presented in the chapter concerns insufficient preparation of matters presented
to the CEOs (p. 105-106) and a general reluctance to establish policies (p. 106-107). In the
latter case the CEOs were in danger of becoming overloaded with details in a vicious circle.
At the end of the chapter a very brief presentation is made of the nature of the activities
(p.107-108). The main conclusions are that getting information was the most frequent activity
and that there were large differences in the CEO behavior between centralized and
decentralized companies.
Chapter seven is devoted to a general discussion about the findings in the study.
Carlson was rather disappointed with the fact that he didn't succeed to develop clear
operational concepts and that he lacked a general theoretical system in which the observations
could be arranged in (p. 115). He considered the development of a method for measuring and
analyzing managerial behavior as his most important contribution, although he recognize the
need for further refinements - especially for describing the content of the behavior (p. 112).
The main conclusion in Executive Behavior is that managerial work need to be studied in its
social context and to be focused on the attentions, goals and attitudes of the actors. The
researchers thus needed both to enter the black box of the CEO mind and to relate his
behavior to the social and physical environment.
Executive Behaviour, the background
Sune Carlson was born in 1909 and grew up in a "conservative manor milieu"
(Carlson, 1983: 21) outside Örebro in the central part of Sweden. After technical studies at
secondary level he went to the Stockholm School of Economics. In 1932 he graduated for
Professor Bertil Ohlin, famous for his theories in international trade, which he later was
awarded to the Nobel Prize. On Ohlin's recommendation, Carlson went to the University of
8Chicago where he received a Ph.D. in Economics in 1936. The dissertation, published in a
revised form in 1939 "A study on the Pure Theory of Production", has been recognized as a
classic (Johanson, 1995). During his doctorate years, Carlson also studied for long periods at
the Vienna University and at the Columbia University.
Sune Carlson returned to the Stockholm School of Economics in 1937, first as a
substitute for Bertil Ohlin in his teaching in Economics, but Carlson became more and more
interested in the field of business administration, particularly on top management issues.
During the war Carlson was also engaged as secretary on the National Price Control Board. In
this position he made contacts with several prominent business leaders. One of them was
Ragnar Blomquist, CEO of Thule, the largest insurance company in Sweden at that time.
Carlson and Blomquist formed in 1943 a group of company representatives in order to discuss
marketing issues. After an initial successful seminar, Carlson suggested to Blomquist that
something similar could be done with top CEOs (Carlson 1983: 150ff). Blomquist found the
idea worth a try.
Based on Blomquist's and Carlson's personal contacts "The Administrative
Problem Study Group" (The A-group) was formed in the spring of 1944. During the following
years the group met biannually to discuss administrative problems for a full day. Thanks to a
donation from the companies in the group, a new chair was established at Stockholm School
of Economics for Sune Carlson. This was the first chair in Sweden directed towards corporate
administration.
In the autumn of 1946 Carlson went to the United States on commission from
the A-group to study the latest developments in management research and he met for instance
leading professors such as Chester Barnard and Elton Mayo. During the trip Carlson got the
idea to do "a study of what CEOs were doing hour by hour, where they were located, whom
they meet, what they were reading and how all this taken together influenced their way of
9leading a company" (Ibid., 146-47). Carlson presented the idea to the head of The American
Management Association, Alvin Johnson, and his research director Ernest Dale. They found
the idea fascinating but they doubted that any CEO should want to participate. Back in
Sweden, Carlson took advantage of this reaction and put forward it as a challenge to the A-
group: "The Americans don't think that you dare to participate" (Interview with Sune
Carlson, December 15 1998). The most members of the A-group accepted the invitation and
field studies of nine Swedish CEO's were carried out 1947 - 1949.
Executive Behaviour: The participants
How many CEOs that represent the empirical base in Executive Behaviour is a matter of
definition. Carlson writes early in his book that he had conducted a study of the two CEOs in
the French department store Au Printemps (p. 16). Later in the book (p. 32) he states that the
number of individual cases was 10, nine in Sweden and one in France1. Furthermore, at page
55 one can read "If we return for a moment to the nine managing directors whose behaviour
pattern are the object of this present study[...]". Since no references are made to the French
CEOs, it is reasonable to say that the empirical material in Executive Behaviour consisted of
the nine Swedish CEOs that were studied. These CEOs were:
Erik Bengtsson, (born 1886) Civil Engineer in Metallurgy 1912.
CEO of Boliden 1941-49, then the second largest mining company in the country. Head office
in Skellefteå in the North of Sweden.
                                          
1
  The French CEO was according to Carlson, Pierre Laguionie.
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Torsten B Bergh, (1901) Bachelor of Law.
CEO of Mab & Mya 1936-1955, at that time one of the largest textiles mills in Sweden, Head
office in Malmö.
Ernfrid Browaldh, (1889) Bachelor of Law 1912.
CEO of Svenska Handelsbanken 1944-1955, the largest commercial banks in Sweden. Head
office in Stockholm.
Per Egon Gummeson, (1893) Civil Engineer in Metallurgy 1918.
CEO of Höganäs-Billesholm 1935-1960, a mining company with approximately 3200
employees at that time. Head office in Höganäs, Scania.
Alvar Lindencrona, (1910) Bachelor of Law 1934.
CEO of Thule 1947-1964, the largest insurance company in Sweden. Head office in
Stockholm.
Ragnar Sachs, (1902) Bachelor of Business Administration 1923.
CEO of Nordiska Kompaniet (NK) 1937-1958, the third largest retail chain in Sweden. Head
office in Stockholm.
Sven Schwartz, (1891) Civil Engineer in Metallurgy 1916.
CEO of Stockholms bryggerier 1941-1949, the largest brewery in Sweden.
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Iwar Sjögren, (1888) Master of Science 1913.
CEO of Skandia 1944-1955, the second largest insurance company in the country. Head
office in Stockholm.
Nils Åhlund, (1897) Bachelor in Business Administration 1919.
CEO of SLT Göteborg, a Gothenburg-based subsidiary of the large printing companies SLT.
The participants were university graduates from the prestigious educational
institutions in Sweden of that time: Royal College of Technology, Stockholm School of
Economics and the Universities of Lund and Uppsala. At the time of the study the participants
were between 38 and 62 years old (mean 53 years) and their experience from CEO positions
ranged from 1 to 20 years (mean 9 years). The companies they represented employed between
700 (SLT Göteborg) and 3500 (Boliden) people, with a mean value of approximately 2000
employees. At that time all operations (besides international sales) of the participating
companies were taking place within Sweden. The firm with the largest export activities,
Boliden, exported approximately 30% of total sales.
The other members of the A-group, whose behavior was not studied, were:
• Ragnar Blomquist who retired as CEO of Thule in 1947 and therefore wasn't available as
a study object.
• Nils Danielsen, CEO of Uddeholm (a metal & forestry company which then employed
nearly 14.000 persons)
• Helge Ericson, CEO of L M Ericsson (one of the few truly international Swedish
companies of that time, with 18.000 employees world wide)
• Gustav Söderlund, CEO of Skandinaviska Banken (the second largest bank in Sweden)
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• Torsten Åström, CEO of Stockholms Spårvägar until 1947, the public transportation
company in Stockholm.
The participants of the A-group were among the most influential business leaders in
Sweden of that time. Ernfrid Browaldh for instance made important contributions in
restructuring client companies in financial difficulties such as L M Ericsson, SCA, and
Fagersta. Per Egon Gummeson, Ragnar Sachs and Sven Schwartz were board members of
several external companies. Schwartz was also at the time of the study chairman of the
Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF). It is also worth mentioning that among the other
members within the A-group, Nils Danielsen was chairman of the powerful Federation of
Swedish Industries (Industriförbundet) and Gustav Söderlund was regarded as the leading
liaison person between business, government and the labor movement (Söderpalm, 1976).
Söderlund was one of the initiators of the Saltsjöbad Agreement, a cornerstone in the Swedish
Model and during the war he acted as chairman of the powerful Industry Commission, which
held an overall responsibility for the Swedish war time production.
Executive Behaviour: The context
The context for the CEO study in a few words was a small, expansive but a
tightly regulated economy and a politically tense climate where the participants had a close
interaction to each other also outside the A-group.
The government had resumed a close control of the industry during the war and
when the war ended this control continued. The reasons were a fear of a post-war depression
and that the foreign trade was executed within national trade agreements. There were also
spokesmen who wanted to make this kind of regulation permanent, which can be seen as a
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mild form of a planned economy. Heckscher (1946) views the governance in Sweden of that
time as an example of liberal corporativism – where the government seeks cooperation from
legally independent associations such as industry organizations, employers' federations and
labor movement organizations - associations which at the same time are given political
influence. When the war broke out business leaders were invited to work within several
commissions, which were given the responsibility of rearmament and provision of basic
goods.
The Swedish economy was very expansive during the period when the CEO
study was conducted. The industrial production was growing at around 7% per year and
foreign trade was expanding even faster (Bentzel, 1967). The customer demand was very
strong; the growth was mainly hampered by shortages. The CEOs had to be engaged in the
governmental commissions and industry associations not least in order to be able to buy and
sell scarce products for their companies (Höglund 1953: 21).
During the study many of the CEOs were busy with activities related to the
general expansion. At Mab & Mya, new factories were put up in the inland of Scania. Nils
Åhlund was responsible for the erection of a new main factory in Göteborg and Per Egon
Gummeson supervised several building investments at Höganäs.
The period during which the CEO-study took place was politically tense. The
Social Democrats advocated an increased state control of business life in their postwar-
program of 1944 which also suggested that important natural resources and large
accumulations of capital perhaps should be owned by the State. Some of the participants were
therefore working under a strongly perceived threat of socialization (Englund, 1982). They
were mainly the CEOs of Handelsbanken, Skandia, Thule because of a large capital base and
the CEO of Boliden because of the valuable ore fields.
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In the general election of 1948, the Liberal and the Conservative opposition,
now mainly represented by Sune Carlson's former professor Bertil Ohlin (who became leader
of the Liberal Party in 1944), confronted the Social Democrats. Several members of the A-
group did strongly support the Liberals such as Erik Bengtsson, Sven Schwartz, Helge
Ericson and Nils Danielsen. The Social Democrats lost some votes but were able to remain in
power. The new Prime Minister Tage Erlander favored a pragmatic and cooperative attitude
towards the business life, and radical proposals of state intervention were rejected. The
Swedish model went into its springtime.
In the spring of 1949 the Committee for Promoting Export and Production was
set up between government, business life and the labor unions (Söderpalm, 1976). Four out of
six representatives of business life belonged to the A-group. They were Ernfrid Browaldh
(representing the Swedish Bankers' Association), Iwar Sjögren (The Federation of Insurance
Companies), Sven Schwartz (The Swedish Employers' Confederation) and Helge Ericson
(The Federation of Swedish Industries). The composition of this important committee reflects
the prominence of the participants in the A-group.
An effect of the relatively small size of the Swedish economy combined with the
intense cooperation on industry and governmental level was that the participants often had
close interaction also outside the A-group. Occasionally they were in conflicts with each
other. At Uddeholm a conflict emerged between the CEO Nils Danielsen and the board in
which Ragnar Blomquist and Per Egon Gummeson were members. On the basis of an
investigation by Gummeson, the board wanted to pursue a radical restructuring of the
company (Jakenberg, 1991). Danielsen rejected this idea and at the annual shareholders'
meeting in 1949, he won an election and the board had to resign. Sven Schwartz was elected
as chairman of Uddeholm and Gustav Söderlund, a fifth actor from the A-group also became
a member.
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Sven Schwartz also took part in a conflict on the board of Thule. Alvar
Lindencrona, the CEO of Thule since 1947 criticized in an article from 1949 the fact that the
Liberal and the Conservative Parties were receiving money from trade and industry (Englund,
1982). This topic was highly controversial and three members on the board, among them Sven
Schwartz and Helge Ericson, started a counterattack. Sven Schwartz had recently replaced
Erik Bengtsson as CEO of Boliden and during the election of 1948 a contribution of 50.000
SEK from Boliden to the Liberal Party had caused a virulent debate. In 1950, however, the
board members who were still supporting Alvar Lindencrona won the election and Schwartz
and Ericson resigned consequently. Ragnar Blomquist, the former CEO, re-entered the Thule
board as a substitute on this occasion.
In what way the conflicts at Uddeholm and Thule affected the work in the A-
group is an interesting question, but unfortunately Sune Carlson didn't remember this events
in the interviews. It is also uncertain whether he had an insight into the conflicts, since they
mostly took place behind closed doors.
Executive Behaviour: Conducting the Study
Before Sune Carlson started the empirical work, he had access to two earlier
empirical studies of administrative behavior, the first on how 21 city managers distributed
their working hours during a week (Nolting 1942) and the second by Harold Lasswell (1947).
The latter is perhaps the single most influential source for Carlson since it was used not only
for the preparation for the empirical work but also for the interpretation of the results.
Lasswell describes in the article how administrators are influenced by external factors, which
direct their focus of attention, often in a counterproductive way, and he presents a method for
the analysis of such deficiencies. The method is self-observation in a way, which does not
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interfere with the natural work processes. Pocket-sized forms easy to fill in were presented as
the solution.
In the beginning of the empirical work, it was mainly people close to the CEO
who were responsible for the data collection but soon the CEOs were also given a
standardized form, due to the fact that some information could only be provided by the CEO.
The intention of not letting the investigation interfere with their daily work was generally
successful but in one case the behavior of one CEO was changed:
"Iwar Sjögren at Skandia, he had an office with two entrances so that he didn't
have to pass his secretary who he had a lot of respect for, and my technique didn't work then
because the secretary didn't always know whether he was at his office or not. So we had to
lock the door during the investigation period, but it changed his behavioral pattern. When I
was interviewing his co-workers they said that before he came to our offices and we were just
talking. Now they had to go to his office and he had become a totally different person."
(Interview with Sune Carlson December 8, 1998)
Executive Behaviour was a very ambitious project, a huge empirical material was
gathered by the use of several data sources:
• diaries from the CEOs themselves
• contact sheets made by secretaries, telephone operators and porters
• interviews with the CEOs and their subordinates,
• listings of all in- and out-going written communication and all longer external trips
during a year.
Besides the material of the behavior of the CEOs, information about the structure and
processes of each organization were collected. In many cases it was Carlson and his assistant
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Rune Höglund, who constructed the first formal organizational charts of the studied
companies.
The idea was to do individual case studies, not to make a statistical study of
"mean behavior". Carlson was more focused on comparing the CEO behavior with the
structure of the formal organization. The CEOs should ideally devote their working efforts in
a systematic way reflecting the formal organization. Carlson seems to view large deviations
between the formal and the informal organization as bad regarding efficiency (Jönsson, 1995).
The presentation of the results is rather general and most of the quantitative data
refer to a "typical" CEO. One reason for the rather summary presentation of the results was
due to the "customized" categorization there the existing functions and the direct-reporting
managers of each company were used as categories. The inductive nature of data collection,
(see for example the secretary form on page 40) made tabulations difficult to do. What kind of
data and how it was collected also evolved over the study period, thus making it difficult to
compare individual studies. A pure observational approach from the start was later
complemented by interviews and a CEO diary form (p. 46). Furthermore differences in
quality of material gathered (p. 51) seem also to have been an obstructing factor in the
compilation work.
But the biggest obstacle surely must have been to compile such a huge empirical
material without assistance from computers. For just one CEO it was registered 744 activities
(Höglund, 1953: 14) and each activity consisted of several (up to 10) descriptors. To tabulate
several thousand activities in all the dimensions seems almost to have been an overwhelming
task at that time.
As often in social science research there is a connection between theoretical
perspective and the generated results in Executive Behaviour. In the following sections the
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philosophy of positivism, the preoccupation with rationalization and the inspiration of social
sciences will be discussed.
Empirical positivism as the point of departure
Executive Behaviour was written at a time when social science was under a
strong influence of natural science. The speculative nature of many theories in social science
was under criticism from advocates of empirically grounded theories. The seemingly rigorous
methodology of natural science with the use of clearly defined and operational concepts and
testing of hypotheses in order to reveal general laws of causation was regarded as an ideal.
An important reference in Executive Behaviour is Gulick (1937) who advocates
the development of clear concepts and unambiguous measurements in administrative
research. Furthermore, Carlson argued that the concepts used should be operational – the
physical concept of length was regarded as an exemplary operational concept with reference
to Bridgman (1928). The methods of measuring length were clearly defined, and not
dependent on the judgement of the researcher. To determine the length of an object is a matter
of accuracy and Carlson argued for the need of more precise methods of measure
administrative behavior.
Carlson concluded that the then present literature on managerial work was of
little use since it was mainly speculating about what a manager should do or actually did.
Abstract concepts such as coordinating and commanding were rejected by Carlson since it
were not possible to relate them to clearly defined sets of operations (p. 24).
Carlson's skepticism towards the current administrative theory was a major
reason for choosing an inductive approach. The inductive strategy did however not work
when categorizing the dimension of "kind of action". In order to do a meaningful
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classification Carlson had to choose one perspective on what a CEO was supposed to do and
after some hesitation he viewed the CEO as a decision-maker:
”In simple terms one may perhaps say that the main task of an executive is to
take decisions or to see to it that decisions are taken by others, and to make sure that these
decisions are carried out by the members of his organization.” (p. 38)
In the interview of December 8, 1999 Carlson stated that he had constructed this
classification on basis of a few days of direct observation of Per Egon Gummeson of
Höganäs. The use of direct observation of CEO behavior is not mentioned in the book.
In order to gain knowledge about the nature of managerial work, an
observational method appears to be much more reliable to Carlson than for instance
interviews, which could contain subjective information. Observation is of course the suitable
method in empirical research within natural science and systematic observation fits very well
together with a positivistic epistemology. The dedication of the book is obviously in line with
this epistemology: "To the managing directors who courageously and graciously have played
the rôle of guinea-pigs in this study"
Maybe Carlson became overly critical of the empirical material because of the
positivistic epistemology. He was not able to present clearly formulated hypotheses. He found
it problematic that the study partly had to rely on the CEO's opinion of his own behavior (and
not his factual behavior) and he couldn't develop new administrative concepts which
corresponded to clearly defined sets of operations. 50 years later the situation seems not to
have changed much in this regard, solid knowledge in a positivistic meaning is rare even
today (Hales, 1986, Mintzberg, 1991). If Carlson had adopted a "weaker" epistemology he
might have regarded his material in a more positive way. Executive Behaviour probably still
represents the most extensive and best empirically grounded study of CEO work ever made.
CEO work is difficult to describe in terms of facts and laws, but it is a major loss for the
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advance in research, that the richness of illustrative episodes and leader characteristics which
almost unavoidably became revealed in a unique study like this, never were published.
Rationalizing administrative work: the use of work analysis and other
techniques for revealing administrative pathologies
A striking feature in Executive Behaviour is the preoccupation with
administrative rationalization. The time and motion-studies so often used in order to develop
more effective methods of conducting manual work now became used for describing and
analyzing CEO work. Carlson explained their approach in the concluding chapter: "Our
immediate practical interest generally was the saving of executive time, the most efficient
behavior meant in most instances that behavior which resulted in the accomplishment of a
certain task in the shortest possible time." (p. 114)
The assumption that the purpose of administrative work is to reach the highest
possible efficiency can be connected with the work of Frederic Taylor and other prominent
figures within the scientific management movement but also with influential researchers such
as Luther Gulick, Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon. In Sweden the efforts to reach
increased efficiency through careful planning and the uses of scientific methods was labeled
"the rationalization movement" (DeGeer, 1978). The rationalization movement consisted of
practitioners, consultants and professors who worked for the diffusion of scientific
management ideas and practices.
Several participants of the A-group were reputed representatives of the
rationalization movement in Sweden. Ragnar Blomquist, the chairman of the A-group was
widely recognized as an expert on rationalization since as the CEO of Höganäs between 1925
and 1935, he was able to rescue the company from a serious financial crisis. Ragnar Sachs did
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during the period belong to a similar kind of committee as the A-group since he was a
member of the International Association of Department Stores, consisting of eight different
department stores around Europe (Pasdermadjian, 1950). This association was founded in
1928 by an initiative from the International Management Institute in Geneva with the purpose
to share experiences about scientific management in a systematic way between the member
firms.
Among the other participants it is worth mentioning that Gustav Söderlund was
a member of the governmental rationalization committee during its existence between 1936
and 1939 and that Helge Ericson, likewise Blomquist, had led recognized rationalization
efforts during his career (Attman & Olsson, 1977: 159ff). Furthermore, Carlson said (in an
interview December 8, 1998) that Tarras Sällfors, the perhaps most prominent member of the
Swedish rationalization movement was a regular visitor at the A-group meetings. Sällfors had
been professor of Industrial Organization at the Royal College of Technology but was during
his career more directed towards practical rationalization than academic research (DeGeer,
1995).
Carlson was as earlier mentioned inspired by Harold Lasswell who had initiated
studies of self-observation of administrators that had got into trouble (Lasswell, 1947, 280ff).
Simple recordings revealed external and internal processes that had led the administrator to
behave in an unwanted way. A large part of Executive Behaviour is devoted to describing
such deficiencies in administrative work. Later in the book the concept of "administrative
pathology" is used to describe these deficiencies which according to Carlson represent
"deviations from admittedly more efficient procedures" (p. 114). These occurrences of
activities of more or less pathological nature in administrative work represent one of the main
results in Executive Behaviour and many of them is still of high relevance, and has been
affirmed by later studies. The analysis of administrative deficiencies also reveals a good
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picture about what was considered as "normal" behavior in order to understand the main
conceptions about efficient management of that time.
The exceptional situation of right now (wishful thinking)
Carlson noted that many of the CEOs perceived that they were living under extraordinary
times but that future held in promise of a return of the normal time (p. 65). He viewed this as
a tendency towards wishful thinking and that the future would not be more easy to handle.
Therefore the CEO should made necessary readjustments and reorganizations in order to
handle the present situation better. The existence of wishful thinking in managerial work has
been acknowledged in later studies on strategy formation (Jönsson & Lundin, 1977).
"The diary complex"
Another revealed pathology was that the CEOs use of time was determined by the notes in the
calendar in such large extent that more spontaneous, but important, activities seldom took
place (p. 71). The CEOs for example greatly valued inspection tours but since they often were
not scheduled, no time for them became available. The appointment diaries sometimes also
did not reflect what was of the most importance for the CEO but what was important for other
people. The diary complex has a clear parallel to Herbert Simons proposition that
programmed activity tends to drive out nonprogrammed activity (Simon, 1965: 67). The role
of the calendar for determining the content of managerial work is an important insight, but the
author is not aware of a study, which investigate this question more deeply.
The lack of time for undisturbed work
Carlson noted that the periods of time working alone were difficult to use effectively since an
interruption was likely to occur at short notice (p. 72ff). Therefore, the CEOs had to work
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very early in the morning or at home with tasks that required high concentration. In one case
Carlson did recommend one of the participants (Ernfrid Browaldh) to hire an executive
assistant since he seemed to be working in a very fragmented way (Interview December 8,
1999). However the advice turned out not to be so good, as Browaldh had difficulties working
with an executive assistant and the assistant himself worked more like an executive than as an
assistant should. The fragmented nature of managerial work and its consequences has been
further recognized and discussed in later studies, not at least in Mintzberg (1973).
The too heavy work load
The general opinion of the CEOs and particularly of their secretaries was that they had a too
big working load (pp. 75ff). The CEOs' working conditions were not sustainable in the long
run, and they had to sacrifice their private life to a large extent. Carlson also felt that, due to
the working conditions, the CEOs often developed a narrow technical and commercial
orientation and he also felt that there was a general need of industrial leaders with a wide
knowledge of social and cultural affairs. The extensive workload in managerial work has been
recognized in several later studies.
The inefficient organization of committee work
Meetings between several groupings on a regular basis were a time consuming task for most
of the CEOs. The committee work did however have a tendency to involve too many people;
to take more time than planned, to be badly integrated and coordinated with other activities
and committees, etc (pp. 86ff). Many of the CEOs were part of external governmental
committees and they where required to attend at short notice, which could cause disturbances
in the internal administrative work. The experienced committee worker of today will probably
still find Carlson's description to be relevant.
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The unwillingness to establish policy
Finally Carlson noticed that activities of policy character were relatively rare (pp. 106ff).
Even if it could be the case that the reason for this was the existence of a well functioning
policy system or a general need for flexibility, Carlson mainly perceived the lack of policy
matters as a pathology. The CEO could for instance still be running the company in the same
detailed manner as when it was considerably smaller. Also, the CEO could avoid taking
policy decisions since they generally are more difficult and time-consuming to do. But, by
behaving like this, the CEO would be caught in a vicious cycle with an overload of details
according to Carlson.
The pathologies mentioned above, together with some other administrative
deficiencies of more or less pathological character such as non-systematic distributions of
contacts, the too extensive paper flow to the CEO, the inefficient handling of visitors and a
the lack of proper preparation of activities through expert consultation (p 104), can be used in
order to interpret streams of thought in Executive Behaviour. How should "normal"
management be constituted according to Carlson?
The picture one is given about efficient administration is a manager that works
as a policy-maker and decision-maker, who establishes policies and makes decision based on
systematic and rational analysis. The CEO should primarily be at his office in order to
influence the organization and also allocate a huge proportion of his time towards reading,
reflection and planning. The more reactive CEO who worked fragmentally and seldom made
decisions appeared to be inadequate now that administrative work was to be rationalized.
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The CEO and his environment: Insights from social sciences
There are several references made to researchers in social science in Executive
Behaviour, and influences primarily from anthropology, sociology and political science are
traceable. Lloyd Warner's study of urban life in a small New England town (Warner & Lunt,
1941) probably inspired Carlson to do a separate chapter (chapter 3) about the social
environment of Swedish CEOs. Carlson's analysis of the informal status symbols in
administrative work (pp. 77ff) has definitely strong connections with Warner's study which
has a focus on the signs of social stratification. Carlson also mentions in the preface that he
had felt like a social anthropologist when conducting the study (p. 9)
As an answer to the direct question about what results he considered to be the
most important result in Executive Behaviour, Carlson said without hesitation: "The
importance of geography" (interview December 8, 1998). The geographical dimension is both
related to whether the head office was located in a big city or in the countryside and the
physical arrangements of office buildings. In the former case the CEO tended to be the head
of the whole district at that time. In the latter case Carlson was able to identify a link between
office layout and communication patterns:
"A different part of the building or even different floor from that where the chief
executive's office was situated meant in most cases a definite contact barrier." (p. 96)
Carlson recalled in the interview that he had made a comment to the CEO of
Thule, that he was meeting his Finance manager every day and that there was no need to do
that. Carlson suggested that the Finance manager was moved upstairs and switched office
with the manager for property insurance, as there was a need for close contact since that unit
was in difficulties. This move changed the contact pattern of the CEO. The significance of
physical arrangement in determining communication patterns has largely been neglected by
the organization theory, with its focus on either the formal or the informal organization.
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Geography should perhaps be considered as important as authority lines and social groupings
for explaining organizing processes. To put it differently, organization theory is focussing
structures and processes but not so much on the space that is surrounding the structure and the
processes. Carlson also puts a focus on the time that is an always present feature in activities
of organizing. Organizational activities (processes) can be described in a frozen picture as
structures but they also take place in a space during a certain period of time. To understand
the processes and structures, there is a need of analyzing the content of time and space.
Executive Behaviour could have been a rather dull piece of research given its
methodological approach, which is based on natural sciences and its rationalistic view on
administration. Many books have been written in an analytical/rationalistic tradition, where
prescriptive hypotheses on managerial work are presented. What Carlson experiences as a
failure (he didn't develop new theoretical concepts and testable hypotheses) should rather be
viewed as a learning process where Carlson gained insight about the intricate nature of
managerial work. He became aware of the subjective character of management, the CEO and
his co-workers often perceived the same situation completely different (p. 118). To put it
clearly the CEOs were part of a larger social system which they interacted with. Effective
management should therefore not be seen as execution of the individual traits of the CEO but
as a collective performance.
In the most quoted passage in Executive Behaviour, Carlson writes that in the
beginning of the study he perceived the CEO as a conductor of an orchestra, but now in some
respects he sees him as a puppet in a puppet-show (p. 52). This gives a fairly good description
of the learning process where empirical observations and insights from social science
counterweighted the more instrumental view of rational administrative behavior. The focus on
the social and physical environment and the behavioral approach together contributed to the
development of what can be perceived as an external control perspective. In this connection,
27
Lasswell (1947) was a source of inspiration since he in a lucid way presents how
administrative behavior can be influenced by external factors. In the article Lasswell points
out that material conditions in the environment have influence on the focus of attention of the
actor. Administrators are capable of, and recurrently do, intentional acts, but their intentions
are to a large extent governed by their focus of attention, which in its turn is influenced by the
social and physical environment.
Also, the behavioral approach, which is related to the ideology of behaviorism,
often results in conclusions where the freedom of the actor is downplayed. The behavior of an
actor is likely to be viewed as a response to an external stimulus. However, it should be
pointed out that Carlson never adopted the behaviorism of B F Skinner, only that a behavioral
approach easily can contradict a voluntaristic view of the CEO as a rational decision-maker.
Rather, the results in Executive Behavior indicated that the CEOs were to a large extent
caught in a web created by the persons in their environment.
The importance of Executive Behaviour
The possibilities of further research for Sune Carlson were very good after the publication of
Executive Behaviour. A large empirical material had been gathered, and only a minor part of
it seems to have been used in the book. A cooperation with a prominent group of CEOs was
well established and Carlson made good use of their willingness to participate in, and great
experience of, committee works. Such a trustful and intensive cooperation seems to be very
rare between researchers and this kind of practitioners. Subsequent studies have mostly been
directed towards middle and lower managers, often in connection with some management
training. Since Carlson was doing the study at a time when management research was in its
infancy, the possibilities of creating an important school of thought was promising.
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The situation after the publication of Executive Behaviour has similarities with
the situation of the Hawthorne study in the late twenties when Elton Mayo and his research
group started to find new theoretical explanations of the inconclusive results from the earlier
experiments of illumination and fatigue. Mayo and his group gradually abandoned the
positivistic approach and the social environment of the workers was put in focus. Carlson had
for instance the opportunity to pursue a deeper investigation into the interplay between the
CEO, and his most important co-workers - thus being able to more precisely describe in what
way the CEO was able to maintain influence over the organization and how his attention was
controlled by others.
The possibilities of further research were not fulfilled. The main reason was that
Sune Carlson started a managerial career within the United Nations in 1952. Carlson had
since early years a strong international orientation and he valued traveling and working in
different countries. Perhaps he wanted to practice himself what he had learned from the CEO
study. In 1958 he returned to Sweden and to academic research, when he accepted a chair as
professor of a new department in business administration at Uppsala University. At that time
he didn't want to create a small replicate of Stockholm School of Economics but rather to
develop a new orientation in the same way as he had done when he became specialized on
corporate administration during the war. Carlson chose the field of international business, and
thus left the research path he had pointed out in Executive Behavior:
"The first book I wrote [when I had returned to research] was Financial
Investment Decisions and then I became totally directed towards international business.
There I had an ideal background. I had had [Jacob] Viner as one of my teachers. He and
Bertil Ohlin were world leaders in that field and I had been working abroad. I felt it obvious
that I was going to do studies in international business." (Interview with Sune Carlson 1998-
12-08)
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 The observation of the extensiveness of public relation activities and the
accompanying experience that they were inefficiently organized constituted the reasons for
the realization of a second extensive research project within the A-group. This project was
carried out by Carlson's assistant Rune Höglund and resulted in 1953 in one of the first
doctoral dissertations in business administration in Sweden. In focus of the dissertation was
the organization of contacts between five of the companies represented in the A-group and the
government/public sector.
In 1954, Höglund left Stockholm School of Economics for the position as
administrative consultant in Svenska Handelsbanken. In 1960 he became deputy CEO and
during the period 1966-1970 he was the CEO of the bank. He then succeeded Tore Browaldh,
who in his turn had succeeded his father (and A-group member) Ernfrid Browaldh. The fact
that both Carlson and Höglund left research led to an end of the activities within the A-group
and the empirical material had most probably been dispersed during the following years.
At Stockholm School of Economics Carlson was replaced by Paulson Frenckner
and Gunnar Westerlund but they didn't continue the same kind of research Carlson had done.
Almost 30 years passed before a similar study was conducted in Sweden (Forsblad, 1980) and
during that time the knowledge development in the area of managerial work went on outside
Sweden. Executive Behaviour inspired a stream of further research studies, especially in
Britain (Thomason, 1966). These studies, which engaged a broad spectrum of managers in
self-recording ranged from Burns (1957), Brewer & Tomlinson (1964), Horn & Lupton
(1965) to Stewart (1967). The latter is the most extensive study of managerial work ever
conducted, no less than 160 managers on all levels participated and more than 40.000
activities were registered all together. The British studies used the same positivistic
methodology which Carlson was about to abandon and the interpretative and qualitative
results in Executive Behaviour were largely neglected.
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The major US studies on this subject (Sayles, 1964), (Mintzberg, 1973), (Kotter,
1982) and (Luthans, 1988), mostly make references to Executive Behaviour in order to
acknowledge its pioneering role, but don't make much use of it. The important exception is
Mintzberg's study "The Nature of Managerial Work" in which Executive Behaviour is a major
source of inspiration. Mintzberg's analysis resembles Carlson's and his attention towards
administrative pathologies. Mintzberg also felt that the CEOs were in need of some help in
order to restructure their work, since they worked in a too reactive and superficial way. The
CEO work was not enough programmed (compare with the unwillingness of Carlson's CEOs
to create policies) which led to ever increasing work pressures. Mintzberg argued that the help
of a management scientist could break up this vicious cycle.
The unique qualities of Executive Behaviour appear to have been more
recognized during the last few decades. The lack of rigorous presentation of results seem not
to be such a large drawback with the book, with the consideration of changing ideals of what
is constituting good research and also due to the fact that many of Carlson's results have been
replicated in later studies anyway. Two of the leading researchers within the field, Henry
Mintzberg and Rosemary Stewart, acknowledged the great contribution of Sune Carlson in a
seminar at Uppsala University in 1989. Mintzberg then stated that Executive Behaviour
"remains perfectly contemporary and insightful" (Mintzberg, 1991: 98) and Stewart pointed
out the she has always been conscious of "the debt that studies of managerial work and
behaviour owe to Sune Carlson" (Stewart, 1991: 120). Stewart also stresses that she had
found the concept of administrative pathologies useful and encouraged others to do research
in this subject.
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Conclusions
Executive Behaviour still occupies a central position in behavioral oriented
management research. It combines a pioneer role with a contemporary position, since there
are characteristics in managerial work that have remained relatively unchanged over time.
Carlson wanted to do an empirical field study in order to counterbalance the influences of
more speculative theories of management. He started the investigation with a positivistic
methodology and a rationalistic view on management, but he also became inspired by
research within social science. The anthropological observations and the sociological
interpretations generate an interesting contrast to rationalism and positivism. Carlson was thus
able both to identify the deficiencies in the current management theory but also the
deficiencies of the positivistic approach in management research. This is a lesson which
subsequent researchers in the field should have learnt much earlier. An unambiguous
description of what a manager does, or should do, can not be constructed.
It appears that Carlson was about to abandon the rational view on management
and instead focus on the social environment and the interplay between the CEO and his co-
workers, thus viewing management as a collective accomplishment. Given the rich empirical
material gathered and the intense cooperation with the Swedish business elite, the prospects of
establishing a central school of thought within management and organization theory were
good. But the full potential of this research project was never realized due to the fact that
Carlson became a management practitioner himself.
Maybe it is the amalgamation of systematic research and creative insights
presented in an honest and openhearted way that makes Executive Behaviour fruitful reading
after all these years. Carlson honestly admitted the limitations of the study in a way that one
had liked to read more often. Compared with the following studies during the fifties and the
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sixties Executive Behaviour appears to have the most to say to students of management and
organization theory.
Regarding the most important conclusions of the book, it is striking how broad
the analysis is. Carlson was studying how the CEOs used their working time, the appearance
of the formal and informal organization, the execution of good and less good processes of
administration, and stressed the importance of the social and physical environment.
Structures, processes, time and space are together shaping a general picture of managerial
work in the book. Executive Behaviour should therefore stilled be used as a source of
inspiration in future research in management and organization theory.
Appendix: The Thule house
Picture of Thulehuset, Sveavägen 44, Stockholm
The "Thule house", erected in 1940 can be used as an illustration of the research carried out
within the A-group. The Thule house was the first office building in the functionalistic style
in Sweden. Ragnar Blomquist, the spiritual leader of the A-group, designed it to a large
extent. It was designed in same way as a factory in order to get such an efficient flow of paper
and short walking distances for the employees as possible. Work analysis was used in the
development of the office layout. The Thule house represented a radical break from other
head offices of insurance companies, which had conservative architecture. Thule had during
the period the image of being the most progressive company in the field of insurance
(Englund, 1982)
The constituting meeting of the A-group was held at the Thule house. The
members of the A-group had strong beliefs in science as a means to create a better society. As
the modernization process of Sweden was carried on, the CEO-function should also be
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reformed. Old traditions and charismatic leadership should be replaced by working methods
based on systematic analysis. The perfectly rational organization, however, remains a dream.
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